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3Introduction
In April 2013, more than five inches of rain fell upon the city within twenty-four hours.1 
The precipitation turned major expressways into concrete-bottomed ponds, submerged 
hundreds of roads and homes, filled the city’s flood control system past its 2.3 billion 
gallon limit, and forced the governor to declare a state of emergency.2  Surprisingly, this 
disaster did not happen in New Orleans, Norfolk, or any other city that the United States 
expects to see featured as flooded on the news. Instead, Chicago found itself thrust into 
an unfamiliar limelight.
That April storm set a number of new records in Chicago and in the country. For 
example, the National Weather Service recorded record-high crests for five rivers at nine 
different sites in northern Illinois.3  More pertinent to the legal community was the suit 
that Farmers Insurance Group subsequently filed against the City of Chicago and ninety-
nine (99) other municipalities and organizations (“Chicago Municipalities”).4   According 
to the complaint, Chicago Municipalities “knew or should have known that climate 
change . . . [had] resulted in greater rain fall volume, greater rainfall intensity and greater 
rainfall duration . . . resulting in greater stormwater runoff . . . .”5  Consequently, Farmers 
Insurance argued that Chicago Municipalities should have increased the capacity of or 
updated its sewer and stormwater storage systems to prevent the foreseeable flooding. 6 
Farmers Insurance eventually dropped the suit, telling the press that it “believe[d 
it had] brought important issues to the attention of the respective cities and counties, 
and that policyholders’ interests [would] be protected by the local governments moving 
forward.”7  However, Michal Gerard, the director of Columbia Law School’s Center for 
Climate Change, stated that these class action suits, the first of their kind, would not be 
the last.8  The Hampton Roads area, which is particularly vulnerable to recurrent flooding 
and sea level rise, represents a primed fuse for such a suit.
This paper analogizes Chicago’s 2013 flood and the corresponding lawsuit to the 
circumstances that haunt Norfolk and other Virginia municipalities. This analysis includes 
discussions regarding Farmers Insurance’s legal arguments, the Virginia equivalent of those 
arguments, and the associated obstacles and success rates for each legal theory.
I. Farmers Insurance’s Legal Framework
Simplified, Farmers Insurance attempted to hold Chicago Municipalities liable for 
flood damage through a class action lawsuit under three separate, but similar, causes of 
action—negligence, negligence per se, and unlawful government takings. The following 
subsections provide the fundamental elements of these liability theories, explain how 
Farmers Insurance used said theories, and apply Virginia legal analysis to Norfolk’s 
situation.
II. Negligence
Negligence, a tort liability theory, is defined as “the failure to exercise the standard of care 
that a reasonably prudent person would have exercised in a similar situation ...”9  Property 
owners in a successful negligence claim against a local government or municipality must 
prove four elements:
41. The municipality had a duty;
2. The municipality breached that duty;
3. The municipality’s breach caused the property owner harm; and
4. The property owners incurred damages as a result of that harm.10
Although the existence of a duty is a question of law decided by a judge,11  foreseeability 
is a persuasive factor in establishing that a duty exists.12  Generally, a reasonable man, or 
a reasonable municipality, is only responsible for injuries or damages which are or could 
be reasonably foreseen. If a judge believes that a municipality owed a duty to property 
owners, then the trier of fact, usually a jury, must determine whether the property owners 
satisfied the remaining elements of the negligence claim.13
A. Recognition of Climate Change as a Factor of Foreseeability 
Leading to Duty
In its complaint, Farmers Insurance maintained that Chicago Municipalities’ formal 
recognition of climate change’s scientific principles, specifically that it has caused 
increases in rainfall, intensity, and duration, created a basis to establish a “general 
duty” to properly maintain and improve upon sewer and stormwater storage systems.14 
As a result of that recognition, Farmers Insurance stated that Chicago Municipalities 
“knew or should have known” that climate change would result in greater stormwater 
runoff and flooding. According to Farmers Insurance, the foreseeability originated 
from the city of Chicago developing and adopting Chicago’s Climate Change Action 
Plan (“CCAP”).
i. Chicago’s Climate Change Action Plan
During his tenure as Mayor of Chicago, Richard M. Daley created a multi-stakeholder 
task force whose purpose, among other objectives, was to determine the challenges 
Chicago faced due to climate change and to describe the ways Chicago needed to 
adapt to the changes already affecting the region.15  In 2008, that taskforce released 
the CCAP. In a report issued by Mayor Daley, he described the CCAP as “a road 
map of what [Chicago] hope[d] to achieve by 2020 to expand [Chicago’s] successes in 
slowing the effects of climate change.”16
Within the CCAP, the task force specifically identified that climate change 
would result in more frequent and intense rain and snowstorms.17 Recognizing that 
“[f]looding and heavy rains ... create havoc with traffic and damage infrastructure,”18 
the CCAP stated that Chicago would both prepare a watershed plan which factored 
in projected climate changes and collaborate with other agencies to use available 
property, including vacant land and parking lots, to manage the resulting increase 
in stormwater runoff.19  The CCAP also elaborated on Chicago’s ongoing efforts to 
“support [its] aging water infrastructure” with onsite mechanisms that would help 
prevent future flooding.20  Included in these efforts was the installation of permeable 
pavement, rooftop gardens, and other systems designed to catch stormwater runoff. 
Since issuing and adopting the CCAP, Mayor Daley and his taskforce have released 
at least one progress report, explaining that from 2008-2009 Chicago installed 1.8 
million square feet of green roofs and 120 green alleys.21  
Using these observations, Farmers Insurance alleged that Chicago Municipalities 
should have known that climate would result in a need for an increase in stormwater 
5storage capacity to prevent flooding. Although its complaint did not specifically 
argue that Chicago municipalities were negligent, this premise set an aggressive and 
somewhat forward-thinking tone to the rest of the document
ii. Virginia’s Governor’s Commission on Climate Change and the 
Commonwealth’s Climate Change Action Plan 
Similar to the CCAP, Virginia’s Governor’s Commission on Climate Change released 
a Climate Change Action Plan (“VaCCAP”) that recognized the dangers of climate 
change and severe weather events. In fact, the VaCCAP specifically states “Hampton 
Roads is particularly vulnerable [to the effects of climate change] due to the low 
elevation of the land and the existence of civilian and military ports, buildings, and 
infrastructure. Stormwater systems will need to be designed to handle larger flows with 
increased storm intensity.”22  Unlike the CCAP, the VaCCAP does not promise that 
the Commonwealth or any of its municipalities will account for climate change 
in future watershed plans. Instead,  it provides recommendations that would help 
Virginia agencies and local governments prepare for and adapt to the impacts of 
climate change.23
B. Virginia Municipalities Have a Duty to Maintain Sewer Systems
There is no way of knowing if a judge would consider the statements from either 
the CCAP or VaCCAP determinative of foreseeability and indicative of a duty to 
property owners. However, it is clear that Virginia municipalities have a common 
law duty to maintain sewer services.24  For example, in Robertson v. Western Virginia 
Water Authority, a sewer line burst causing the partial collapse of a retaining wall 
that bordered private property and caused extensive property damage. The Virginia 
Supreme Court ruled “there is a municipal liability where the property of a private 
persons is flooded, whether directly or by water being set back, when [the flood is] the 
result of . . . the negligent failure to keep [sewers] in repair and free from obstructions.” 
As seen in the 2013 Chicago flood, improperly maintained sewer systems have the 
potential to back up and flood roads, private residences, and cause damage to private 
property (e.g., cars in private or public parking lots). Furthermore, climate change 
may result in sewer systems encountering saltwater, which may corrode or otherwise 
deteriorate Norfolk’s existing sewer system. If Norfolk property owners could 
demonstrate that such corrosion contributed to floods, or that recurrent flooding 
otherwise caused damage to Norfolk’s sewer system which then contributed to flood 
damage, then property owners may be able to establish the necessary duty to move 
forward with a negligence claim. This argument does not parallel the argument made 
by Farmers Insurance, but is based on the same underlying principle—negligence. 
III. Negligence Per Se
Contrasting with negligence, the doctrine of negligence per se replaces the reasonable 
person standard with a standard enunciated in a legislative act.25  Plaintiffs in a lawsuit can 
use both theories of liability in actions that involve personal injury or property damage. 
Property owners in successful negligence per se claims brought against a municipality 
must prove the following three elements:
1. The municipality violated a statute enacted for public safety;
2. The property owners belong to the class of people that the statute was enacted 
to protect; and
3. The property owners incurred damage as a result of the municipality’s violation.26 
6The first and second of these elements are issues of law that are decided by the trial court, 
while the final element is a factual issue that is decided by the trier of fact.27  This means 
that if property owners request a jury trial, then a judge will decide if legislators enacted 
a statute for public safety meant to protect property owners, but a jury will determine 
whether the property owners actually incurred the alleged damage as a result of the 
municipality’s violation.
A. Farmers Insurance’s Statutory Sources of Liability
Farmers Insurance identified two separate statutes that it claimed Illinois enacted to 
protect public safety. These statutes laid the foundation for two separate counts, or 
two separate factual situations that allow for a potential legal remedy.  
Farmers Insurance first alleged that Chicago Municipalities owed Farmers 
Insurance policyholders a duty to safely and properly maintain sewer systems under 
745 ILCS §3-102(1).38  Under that statute: 
[L]ocal public entit[ies have] the duty to exercise ordinary care to maintain [their 
property] in a reasonably safe condition for the use in the exercise of ordinary 
care of people whom the entit[ies] intended and permitted to use the property 
in a manner in which and at such times as it was reasonably foreseeable that it 
would be used...29
Farmers Insurance alleged that because Chicago Municipalities knew that its 
policyholders had experienced previous flooding from sewer and stormwater storage 
systems, that they were aware that the systems, as they existed, posed a risk to 
policyholders’  “health, safety and welfare... 30
In its second count, Farmers Insurance cited to 745 ILCS § 3-103(a), which states 
that local public entities are not liable for injuries caused by the adoption of a plan 
or improvement to public property where a legislative body, or other entity exercising 
discretionary authority, has approved of the plan.31 However, if, after the entity 
executes the plan, “it appears . . . that [the entity] has created a condition that is not 
reasonably safe,” then public entities may be held liable.32  Again, using the CCAP, 
Farmers Insurance argued that Chicago Municipalities knew, or should have known, 
that the various sewer and stormwater storage systems serving policyholders were 
defective and failed to employ flood mitigation strategies during the 2013 flood.33 
The complaint included a lengthy list of such strategies, such as raising the banks 
of nearby rivers with quickly-inflatable property protection systems or sandbags, 
increasing the capacity of stormwater storage structures using the same types of 
techniques, and failing to provide temporary stormwater-protection levees or walls.34 
Farmers Insurance alleged that Chicago Municipalities created conditions that were 
not reasonably safe because it did not implement these strategies.
B. Virginia Municipalities Do Not Have a Statutory Duty to 
Maintain Stormwater Storage or Flood Control Mechanisms
Virginia municipalities do not have a duty to build or maintain stormwater storage 
systems, or any structure or device whose purpose is to prevent flooding of the 
municipality.35  Virginia Code § 15.2-970 states that municipalities “may construct 
a dam, levee, seawall, or other structure or device . . . the purpose of which is to 
7prevent tidal erosion, flooding or inundation [of the municipality].”36  Consequently, 
municipalities do not have to build such structures. Additionally, Code § 15.2-970 
protects municipalities, such as Norfolk, whose stormwater storage systems might 
not serve their purpose by barring “any action at law or suit in equity . . . because 
of, or arising out of, the design, maintenance, performance, operation or existence of 
[such systems].”37   Thus, unlike Illinois’ legal atmosphere, which includes potential 
statutory sources of liability for failure to construct flood-prevention structures, there 
is no authority that obligates Virginia municipalities to mitigate flooding.
Code § 15.2-970 does not shield municipalities from all liability theories. The 
section specifically allows for lawsuits premised upon a written contract between 
a municipality and property owners when a local government, governed by such 
a contract, chooses to exercise its permissive authority to take action to control 
flooding.38  However, Virginia courts have not utilized this exception in any identified 
case.  This could be because municipalities have not violated this type of contract 
or because municipalities simply do not enter into contracts that expose them to 
liability.  Code § 15.2-970 also does not immunize improper government takings, 
which will be discussed later in this paper.39  
i. Protection From Common Law Claims—Sovereign Immunity
After Farmers Insurance filed its claim, lawyers for Chicago Municipalities immediately 
informed the press that they were protected from prosecution by sovereign immunity.40 
If Norfolk property owners attempted to hold the city liable for flood damage, then 
Norfolk would most likely raise the same defense. The Virginia Supreme Court has 
described sovereign immunity as “a rule of social policy, which protects the state from 
burdensome interference with the performance of its governmental functions and 
preserves its control over state funds, property, and instrumentalities.”41  When pled 
correctly, sovereign immunity bars recovery.42 
In Virginia, municipalities perform two types of functions—governmental and 
proprietary. A governmental function is one that directly relates to the general health, 
safety, and welfare of a municipality’s citizens,43  and one that involves a municipality 
utilizing its political, discretionary or legislative authority.44  Municipalities are 
immune from liability for negligence when exercising a government function and for 
failing to exercise a government function.45  Therefore, if property owners attempted 
to hold Norfolk liable for negligently planning or designing a sewer system, Norfolk 
could successfully use sovereign immunity to shield itself from liability.46
However, a municipality may be held liable when private property is flooded as 
a result of negligently maintained sewer systems.47  This possibility exists because 
an allegedly negligent act that involves the routine maintenance or operation of a 
service provided by a municipality is considered proprietary, not governmental.48 
A proprietary function involves a privilege and power performed primarily for 
the benefit of the municipality. Municipalities are not immune from liability for 
negligence in the exercise of proprietary functions. When a municipality’s function is 
both governmental and proprietary, Virginia courts apply sovereign immunity using 
the rationale that “the governmental function is the overriding factor.”49 
Because courts ultimately decide to apply sovereign immunity premised upon 
their own interpretation of a municipality’s actions, there is no way of predicting how 
8or when the defense would bar a negligence claim. If Norfolk property owners, like 
Farmers Insurance, argued that Norfolk failed to design an adequate sewer system, 
or even failed to update its sewer system, then courts would most likely apply the 
doctrine.
IV. Unlawful Takings
Farmers Insurance’s last liability theory is grounded in the constitutional principle 
of government takings. At the federal level the Fifth Amendment guides takings 
claims, which reads “nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just 
compensation.”50  Although Farmers Insurance cited the United States Constitution, the 
following subsections discuss the application of state takings clauses.
A. Illinois’ Takings Clause
Unlike the Fifth Amendment, Article I, Section 15 of Illinois’ Constitution prohibits 
“seizing and damaging” private property without just compensation.  Utilizing 
that language, Farmers Insurance asserted that its policyholders “suffered a direct 
encroachment upon their real properties when stormwater and/or sewer water invaded 
their real properties from [Chicago Municipalities’] sewers and subjected [their policy 
holders’] properties . . . to . . . public use as retention basins and/or detention basins...”52 
Farmers Insurance further asserted that “[the] properties became partially and/or 
totally uninhabitable and/or unstable as a result of . . . [the] sewer water invasions.”53 
Consequently, Farmers Insurance sought just compensation for policyholders whose 
property was damaged or “taken” as a result of the 2013 flood.54
B. Virginia’s Takings Clause
Like Illinois’ takings clause, Article 1, Section 11 of the Virginia Constitution 
provides that “[n]o private property shall be damaged or taken for public use without 
just compensation to the owner thereof.”55  To qualify as damage within the meaning 
of Virginia’s Constitution, the government does not need to have actually invaded 
or disturbed an individual’s property.56  Instead, the government needs only to have 
adversely affected the individual’s ability to exercise his or her rights as a property 
owner.57
Virginia property owners have initiated unlawful takings claims, which are also 
called inverse condemnation claims, against Virginia municipalities as a result of 
flood damage on several occasions. For example, in Kitchen v. the City of Newport 
News, Robert Kitchen (“Kitchen”) alleged that Newport News permitted the over 
development of land above his residence, “which substantially, dramatically, and 
critically increased the amount of water flowing from the watershed through [a 
creek] and into [a pond] conveyance system.”58  Kitchen further maintained that 
Newport News knew that the conveyance system was not designed to withstand 
the corresponding increase in use.  He argued that “the City’s actions and conduct 
. . . created and caused” his residence to be “converted into a retention or detention 
pond” for public use and sought just compensation for the City’s taking.60  Although 
the trial court initially dismissed his case for failure to state a cause of action, the 
Supreme Court of Virginia reversed that decision and remanded his case back to trial, 
explaining that Kitchen had “alleged specific, factual actions of [Newport News] 
which resulted in a taking of property.”61 
9Similarly, in Livingston v. the Virginia Department of Transportation, 134 
homeowners (“Homeowners”) brought an inverse condemnation claim against the 
Virginia Department of Transportation (“VDOT”). In that case, Homeowners 
claimed that their homes flooded because VDOT straightened a curved section of a 
local stream, relocated the stream roughly 1,000 feet closer to their residences, and 
reduced the stream’s width by 38%.62  They also argued that VDOT failed to maintain 
the manufactured channel, which resulted in their homes flooding substantially more 
than they would have but for VDOT’s project.63  Once again, the trial court initially 
dismissed the claim, but the Supreme Court of Virginia reversed and remanded, 
holding that the stream’s relocation constituted a public use that could form the basis 
of an inverse condemnation claim.64 
Neither the Kitchen nor Livingston case demonstrate a wholly successful inverse 
condemnation claim—any amount of money awarded to the plaintiffs could not be 
found on public record. However, they do allow Virginia residents the possibility of 
bringing municipalities to court without an immediate dismissal provided they allege 
specific municipal actions that led to an increase in flooding.
V. Conclusion
Farmers Insurance undoubtedly attracted national attention to an international problem—
recurrent flooding and increased severe weather events resulting form climate change. The 
corresponding complaint, which served as the legal catalyst for that attention, contained 
creative and complex arguments that attempted to hold Chicago Municipalities liable 
for flood damage through negligence, negligence per se, and unlawful takings liability 
theories. If Virginia property owners filed an analogous claim against Norfolk or other 
Virginia municipalities, they would have the highest likelihood of success with an 
unlawful takings claim, an unknown likelihood of success with a negligence claim, and 
the least likelihood of success with a negligence per se claim.
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